Edward Lee Holland v. The Industrial Commission of Utah et al : Brief of Defendants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1956
Edward Lee Holland v. The Industrial Commission
of Utah et al : Brief of Defendants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister; C. C. Parsons; A. D. Moffat; Calvin A. Behle;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Holland v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 8412 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2449
I lllooV&..I W '-1 
/ No. 8412 r«~:w~uaa; 
=================== l.tf .. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH~-; I J_J E~ ··: 
EDWARD LEE HOLLAND,-~:;~- ------.-;t~-~~. c~~-~~:;, .. 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and COLUMBIA - GENEVA 
STEEL DIVISION, UNITED STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Industrial 
· Commission of Utah, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Columbia-
Geneva Steel Division, United 
States Steel Corporation. 
PRINTED IN U.S. A.-JOE R. BROWN PTG. CO., SALT LAKE CITY 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------------1-5 
POINTS RELIED ON: 
Plaintiff's Point 1: 
That the Commission erred in its conclusion that 
plaintiff's injury and disability was not the result 
of an accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. ------------------------·---------------------------------------------5-8 
Plaintiff's Point 2: 
That tbe Commission abused its discretion in enter-
ing its decision denying an award to the plaintiff, 
and that its decision and order were against the law 
and contrary to the evidence introduced and that in 
reaching such decision the said Commission did not 
regularly pursue its authority. ----------------------------------8-12 
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------------------12-13 
Cases Cited 
Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 57 P. 2d 
724, Cited and quoted____________________________________________________ 10 
Nielson, et al. v. Industrial Commission (1917) 120 
Utah 526, 236 P. 2d 346, Cited and quoted________________ 9 
i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ED\V ARD LEE HOLLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and COLUl\1BIA - GENEVA 
STEEL DIVISION, UNITED STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8412 
Plaintiff's application for hearing to settle Indus-
trial Accident Claim was filed with the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah September 13, 1954. It is there alleged 
that on or about July 6,1954 while employed at the Horse 
Canyon Coal ~line of Columbia-Geneva Steel Division 
of United States Steel Corporation plaintiff sustained a 
back injury as follows: " * * * was drilling through rock 
in roof of the mine. The drill broke and the drill jerked 
applicant violently upward." It is also alleged that plain-
tiff left work on July 21, 1954 and that his disability 
had continued to the date of the application. 
Columbia-Genev.a Steel Division denied liability and 
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hearing was held April 1, 1955. At such hearing the 
following facts were made to appear: 
Some time in the early part of July, 1954, plaintiff 
was employed in defendant's coal mine at Horse Canyon. 
On the day of the alleged accident he was on a scaffold 
drilling; the drill broke and in some manner plaintiff 
lost his hold on the stoper and fell on his hands and 
knees, or hands and toe·s (R.20). In about thirty minutes 
Mine Foreman Wadleigh appeared at the scene and 
asked if plaintiff wanted to go to the hospital. Plaintiff 
refused and did not Inention that his back hurt. (R. 45) 
Plaintiff continued to work at his regular job for the 
next week or two weeks. (R. 26) On July 24, 1954 he 
got in touch with Dr. William Ploss (R. 23). About 
July 26, he reported to the Clinic (Ex. 2). He was given 
some pain killer and eventually on August 7, 1954 ad-
mitted to the Utah Permanete Hospital (R. 52, Ex. 1). 
Sometime between August 3rd and 7th plaintiff was 
terminated for unauthorized absence on August 3rd. 
In two separate conversations with his superiors as to 
the reason for such termination he was told the termina-
tion was for such unauthorized absence. On neither of 
these occasions did plaintiff so 1nuch as suggest that his 
absence was due to an industrial .accident, a fall in the 
mine which injured his back. (R. 46, 61.) In the hos-
pital records there is no indication that his difficulty had 
an origin as an industrial accident. (R. 55, 56.) Dr. 
Ploss is the doctor of the United 1\fine "\Yorkers Welfare 
Fund. Had the injury been clain1ed by the employee to 
have an industrial origin it would have been referred to 
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Dr. James 1\.:. i\fcClintock and by him to the employer and 
to the Industrial Commission. Dr. McClintock testified: 
Q. If the employee says it is industrial-
A. I will report it as such. 
Q. You report it as such to the Commrssion. 
A. That is correct. 
(R. 55) and-
"The first implication that I had as a pos-
sible industrial involvement was that involving 
the Industrial Hearing." 
(R. 56) 
The case was referred to Dr. Paul A. Pemberton, 
who on September 8, 1954 removed an intervertebral 
disc. (R. 56) Dr. Pemberton did not report the case to 
the Industrial Commission as an industrial case. (R. 59) 
On September 13, 1954 the said application was filed 
with the Industrial Commission and hearing was held in 
due course. On June 21, 1955 decision was rendered 
denying compensation : 
"Applicant testified that he reported to Dr. 
Ploss that he got hurt in the mine. The hospital 
record does not corroborate this statement. Dr. 
Ploss, the Welfare Fund physician, works in the 
same hospital at Dragerton, that Dr. McClintock, 
the industrial surgeon for defendant, uses for 
industrial patients. 
"It can be reasonably assumed that the 
U.~LW.A. Welfare Fund and its medical staff 
will promptly refer all cases to Dr. McClintock 
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' t 
if they are reported as industrial cases. Surely 
the Welfare Fund is not seeking to increase an 
already heavy burden by voluntarily accepting 
industrial cases. In fact, the entire record nega-
tives applicant's testimony to such an extent that 
his credibility is highly questionable." 
Applicant did have a disc removed by Dr. Pemberton 
but we cannot find that the disc was the result of an 
accident arising out of or in the_ course of employment 
by defendant as alleged or at all. 
Petition for rehearing was filed July 22, 1955, denied 
July 27, 1955, and this original proceeding began August 
26, 1955 by filing a petition in this court for a Writ of 
Review. Nothing more appears until November 14, 1955, 
when this court issued, on its own motion, its "Citation 
for Dismissal returnable Nov. 21." 
That the Commission did not afford credibility to 
plaintiff's testimony is, of course, apparent from the 
decision itself. Plaintiff was very certain that he had 
reported a back injury, sustained in the mine, to Dr. 
Ploss and to Thir. Wadleigh. Yet one of these witnesses 
denied that he had done so. And the records of the hos-
pital corroborate, not the plaintiff, but Thfr. Wadleigh. 
Upon the occasion of his discharge plaintiff made 
no mention of having sust·ained an industrial accident. 
Plaintiff did not dispute this evidence nor explain why 
he had not at that time referred to such an accident. He 
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~ 
: Plaintiff relies on two points: 
1. That the Cornmission erred in its conclusion that 
rt(J: plaintiff's injury and disability was not the result of 
I~ an accident arising out of or in the course of his employ-
[at ment. 
:2. That the Commission abused its discretion in 
entering its decision denying an award to plaintiff, .and 
that its decision and order were against the law and con-
trary to the evidence introduced, and that in reaching 
such decision, the said Cmnmission did not regularly 
pursue its authority. 
The two points will be here discussed in order. 
Plaintiff's Point 1. 
That the Commission erred in its conclusion that plain-
tiff's injury and disabilty was not the result of an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment. 
n~~ It is true that plaintiff testified that he told Dr. 
a Ploss that he had been hurt in the mine. But the Com-
mission was not bound to accept this testimony as estab-
~ lishing the fact that he had made such a statement to 
.Ill Dr. Ploss or that the statement, if made, was true. 
~~ 
Th It is significant th.at Dr. Ploss did not record the 
.~ case as an industrial accident; that it was not referred 
to Dr .. McClintock, the industrial surgeon working in the 
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same hospital. Dr. .McClintock testified clearly and 
positively that if the employee or Company reports the 
case as an industrial one, it is reported to defendant 
and to the Commission as such. 
A. In other words, if it is reported to me as 
industrial, I report it as industrial. If the 
Company thinks it isn't we come down here. 
Q. If the employee says it is industrial-
A. I will report it as such. 
Q. You report it as such to the Commission' 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that is the procedure which is followed 
at your hospital~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. vVhat was the situation in this case~ 
A. I didn't see this man in a professional capacity 
until last n1onth when I examined him and 
returned him to work. (R. 55) 
And l\1:r. Wadleigh : 
Q. If a man falls off a scaffold or jumps off a 
scaffold that high and then tells you that he 
hurt his back, that he has a stinging sensation 
and back pain, would you report that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you don't recall his 1nentioning that at 
alH 
A. No, he \\~as shook up, he told n1e. (R. 47) 
and the same witness: 
Q. When did ~·on first hear that he was .alleging 
a back injnr)· as a result of that fall? 
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A. I don't recall when I first heard of the back 
being injured. When he was, after he had 
been away from work, he called me and I 
don't recall the date, and said that the Com-
pany had terminated him and asked me why. 
And I said I just supposed it was for un-
authorized absence. And I asked him why he 
wasn't at work, and he told me that he was 
having son1e back trouble and that they were 
treating him like, for the same trouble that 
he had in the year past. * * * 
Q. Did he tell you at that time that the back 
trouble he had, that he got it from the fall~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did he ever indicate that was the reason~ 
A. I don't recall that, no. 
Q. Did you ever recall his mentioning to you 
at all his back trouble being connected with 
the fall~ 
A. No. (R. 45, 46) 
~1r. James Cassano, then Supervisor Industrial Rela-
tions, gave the termination notice. The termination was 
for extended, unauthorized absences and in discussing 
the cause with plaintiff-
Q. (Plaintiff) did not rnention that he hurt his 
back in the mine at all to you, not at any 
time~ 
A No, not at any time. Not at .any time. (R. 61) 
Mr. Cassano attempted to find the cause of the 
absences before giving the termination notice. He could 
r: find nothing in the hospital records .as to any sickness 
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at that time-he contacted Dr. Ploss. 
Q. Did Dr. Ploss indicate to you at all when 
you talked to him that ~Ir. Holland had 
claimed that he hurt his back in the mine f 
A. No.*** (R. 63) 
Surely a man who has been injured by a fall to the 
extent that he was prevented thereby from work-
ing would report it to his doctor, his foreman, or to the 
official who terminated him. A man who has been fired 
for failure to report for duty would naturally and surely 
attempt to justify his absence - and even more surely 
would he do so if such absence was due to an industrial 
injury sustained while on the very job from which he was 
discharged. 
Plaintiff's Point 2. 
That th·e Commission abused its discretion in entering 
its decision denying an award to the plaintiff, and that its 
decision and order were against the law and contrary to the 
evidence introduced and that in reaching such decision the 
said Commission did not regularly pursue its authority. 
Here plaintiff seems to argue that the testimony of 
Dr. Ploss and Dr. Pe1nberton should be received. 
rrhe testimony of Dr. Ploss could add nothing to the 
record rnade before the Conunission. It already clearly 
appear:::; that had the alleged injury been considered in-
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nr! 
dustrial by the Company or by the employee himself it 
would have been reported as such and the hospital re-
cords would show that claim. And the uncontradicted 
fact is that it was not reported, nor do the records show 
it, as industrial (R. 55). These facts are not assump-
tions known only to Dr. Ploss; they are clearly established 
by undisputed evidence. 
Dr. Pemberton did not see the plaintiff until Sep-
tember, 1954, and it must be assumed that had the case 
been considered as industrial he would have made the 
required report to the Commission. 
The record is silent as to why Drs. Ploss and Pem-
berton were not called as witnesses. Plaintiff made no 
request that the matter be postponed or continued until 
these doctors could be called. 
The statement of this court in Nielson et al. v. In-
dustrial Commission (1917) 120 Utah 526, 236 P. 2d 
346, is controlling here: 
"The principles announced in Woodburn v. 
Ind. Comm., 1947, 111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d 209, 
seem controlling and we cannot say as a matter 
of law the evidence is susceptible of no other in-
terpretation than that contended for by plaintiffs, 
- or that the findings of the Commission were 
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rrhe rule of law is cle.ar as stated in Kent v. Indus-
trial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 57 P. 2d 724: 
"In the case of denial of compensation, the 
record must disclose that there is maferial, sub-
stantial, competent, 'Uncontradicted evidence suf-
ficient to make a disregard of it justify the con-
clusion, as a m.atter of law, that the Commission 
.arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evi-
dence or unreasonably refused to believe such 
evidence. 
"When we are asked to overturn the findings 
and conclusions of the Commission denying com-
pensation, it must be made clearly to appear that 
the Commission acted wholly without cause in 
rejecting or in refusing to believe or give effect 
to the evidence." 
Plaintiffs' own witnesses testified that he com-
tjlained of hack trouble before the alleged accident. 
Q. Did he complain about the, you say you didn't 
hear him complain about his back for a short 
tin1e thereafter~ 
A. ~ o, he'd say, "~Iy back hurts me this morn-
ing," or maybe we'd sit down and e·at our 
lunch and he'd get up and say, "My back is 
stiff, or back is hurting." 
Q. When did he say this~ 
A. \Yell different ti1ne in the mine, you know. 
Q. Oh, all the time' 
A. Oh no, not all the tin1e. l\I.aybe a week or so 
~~ou know, or something like that. 
Q. You are speaking before, even before this Y 
10 
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A. Oh yes. 
Q. Even before this he'd say this from time to 
time~ 
A. My back hurts me quite often too. 
Q. And he'd say the same thing after he fell off~ 
A. Oh yes. 
Q. You didn't notice any difference in what he 
complained about~ 
A. Not particularly, no. Not at the time. I only 
worked two days I believe after he got hurt. 
Q. But even prior to that time, just like maybe 
you did a lot of times, he'd say, "My back 
hurts me." 
A. Yes,*** 
Of course the Industrial Commission was entitled to 
credit this testimony and to hold that the accident, if 
it happened, was not the cause of any injury to plain-
tiff's back. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah of course has 
had .a long and wide experience with the operation and 
administration of medical plans, both industrial and 
nonindustrial. It knows from that experience, as must 
be apparent to all, that those in charge of a nonindus-
trial plan will not accept .any case if there be a reason-
able hope or justification for passing the burden to an 
industrial plan. 
In particular the Commission is fully familiar with 
the operation and management of the Welfare andRe-
11 
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tirement Fund of the United :Mine vVorkers of America 
and the procedure used by that organization when any 
industrial injury, actual or suspected, is involved. It is 
noteworthy that not only Dr. Ploss failed to consider the 
injury, if any, industrial, but that Dr. William A. Dor-
sey of the Denver office of that fund accepted plaintiff's 
application for medical services under that plan, (Ex. 
2) and payments were made to and accepted by plaintiff. 
From July 1, 1954 up to and including Dr. Pember-
ton's post-operative letter to Dr. Ploss (Ex. 2) there is 
no reference to an industrial accident or to any claim that 
the injury was due to such an accident. It is apparent 
that along the line somewhere some reference to an in-
dustrial accident would have been made had there been 
any foundation for such a claim or assertion. 
Since the entire record refutes plaintiff's contention 
the Commission was at perfect liberty to question his 
credibility .and enter findings contrary to his testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
There is evidence in the record sufficient to support 
the findings and conclusions of the Commission: 
First: Plaintiff complained of back trouble before 
and after the accident. 
Seco11d: Plaintiff di(l not, to his doctors, to his fore-
rnan or to Cmnpany upon the occasion of his discharge, 
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Third: In spite of the practice of reporting all ac-
cidents as industrial claimed by the employee to be such, 
this accident was not reported as industrial to any doctor 
or to the Commission. 
Fourth: Plaintiff's hack difficulty was treated and 
considered by the Welfore ~-,und itself as nonindustrial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Columbia-
Geneva Steel Division, United 
States Steel Corporation. 
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